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Investigating the issue
Those who suffer evil say: no–not–this way. Through a spontaneous refusal 
of reality, the excessive gap between what could possibly have happened 
and did not occur (healing) is expressed, as well as between what should 
have happened and did not occur (justice). In terms of language, with regard 
to evil, reference is made to failure to become. Language, however, in order 
to exist needs a speaker, and this is where — together with language — a 
series of aporias begin to emerge.
First of all, it is worth noting that any objection is flawed by ambiguities: 
those who complain may do so either because of understandable indigna-
tion, or due to the presumption which leads us to think that we are the only 
ones who are able to know how what did not happen could or should have 
occurred. Secondly, it is worth pointing out that the objection to evil as the 
assertion of a failure to become does not invoke the completion of the pro-
cess, but rather the right of being there and remaining before it. If evil ap-
pears as the phenomenon which denies the things that exist, which denies 
the possibility that they may be otherwise and that they might reach their 
target, those who oppose evil, are opposed to it as a reality which remains 
by affirming its existence.
Thirdly, the objection to evil is closely associated with the epistemologi-
cal issue. On the one hand, indeed, thought aspires to the most appropriate 
language to oppose evil, but is faced with the impossibility of properly stat-
ing it before it occurs. On the other hand, after evil has occurred, discussing 
it is the luxury of those who have been spared: posthumous thought loses its 
relevance. Evil, therefore, appears as the phenomenic instance which more 
than any other exposes the possibility of thinking and saying something to 
a series of logical short–circuits. Based on the considerations made above, a 
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rigorous discourse about evil, an appropriate grammar in this respect, could 
hopefully be pursued by stating the use of modal categories and of the af-
firmation and denial assertions which are generally used with regard to this 
issue.
“Impossible possibility” or “impossible reality”? 
The discourse regarding evil has to do with becoming. Already Aristotle 
warned us against the danger of understanding the reality of the self and of 
the world — and therefore also of evil — in terms of “states of things”; in his 
opinion what exists is forever because it is in the act of becoming, to the ex-
tent that the conditions for becoming must be part of the definition of each 
entity1. Starting from this moment in the history of Western philosophy, 
becoming has been associated with the dichotomy action/potency. However, 
in spite of the large number of examples and references to local domains, 
Jüngel points out that, from the writings of Aristotle to the most recent theo-
ries2, a constant attempt has been made to formalize becoming according 
to the primacy of act over potency3. The tautological definition of power 
in Aristotle (potency is the possible translation into an act of what potency 
says it potentially has4) is one of the signs of this primacy granted to the act.
The deconstruction by Jüngel is aimed at overturning Aristotle’s posi-
tion, in order to state the primacy of potency over act, irrespective of which 
— from a theological perspective — a dangerous confusion would arise be-
tween gratuity of faith and compensation through deeds. This argument is 
based on an “ontology of the event of justification” which refers back to St 
Paul’s theology in his epistle to the Galatians. According to the apostle, in-
deed, the Gospel is faith that comes to humans, and not humans reaching 
the faith (Gal. 3,25). This means, obviously, that faith is a gift, but not the 
gift through which a Christian acknowledges God, since this would mean 
that faith is work, more specifically work of knowledge. Therefore, it is not 
faith which belongs to a Christian, but a Christian who belongs to the faith. 
The most appropriate figure of speech to interpret the justification event is 
“transfer of ownership” (Übereignung): the Christian is torn away from want-
1 This is the definition of δύναμις given in Aristotle: Metaphysics, Q, 5, 1048 at 1–2. 
2 Remember, in particular, about Bergson’s reflection regarding the “act in act” (Bergson, 
Henry: L’Évolution créatrice, Paris: Alcan 1907) and about the consequences of the latter 
with regard to the phenomenon of evil in Jankélévitch (Jankélévitch, Vladimir: Le Mal, 
Grenoble: Arthand 1947).
3 Jüngel, Eberhard: Die Welt als Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit. Zum ontologischen Ansatz der 
Rechtfertigungslehre, in: Evangelische Theologie 29 (1969), Kaiser Verlag, 417–442.
4 Aristotle: Metaphysics Q, 3, 1047 at 24–26.
DISPUTATIO PHILOSOPHICA  Roberto Ranieri: Unconditional possibility and absolute affirmation
47
ing to be himself and himself only, so law and sin no longer exert any power 
over him5. The Easter of Jesus, from which the faith event originates, creates 
a difference between what is justified and what is not, which equals the one 
between creation and nothingness6. The faith event regarded as absolute 
and unconditional possibility, moreover, prevents us from viewing the dif-
ference between God and the world as a distinction between two (possible) 
worlds7, divine and human. God, in the gratuitousness of the event, creates 
a distinction between Himself and the world which equals that between 
donor and beneficiary of the gift; this distinction, however, is not “a posteri-
ori”, but starts from the Easter of Jesus, thus from within the only real world. 
Before the almighty creative power of endless equally possible worlds one 
should therefore place the power of resurrection, a paradigm of absolute 
and unconditional possibility: it calls to existence what could otherwise not 
exist. The ontology of the justification event, therefore, allows us to regard 
the world as creatio ex nihilo, and as æx Þnastásewj necrÏn. This gain, for 
theology, should be not so much in the service of ontology, but rather a way 
of considering God as creator and the creature as justified. The ontological 
difference between works and faith, in the primacy of faith, corresponds on 
the side of becoming to the ontological difference between act and potency, 
in the primacy of possibility. Only this difference makes it possible to un-
derstand the subject’s being there as a being which is not lost, because fate 
is always contained in the ever possible evangelical novum. On the contrary, 
wherever act and potency are confused, it is denied that something uncon-
ditional could occur. What becomes, in this case, is an internal product of 
the process, therefore there is no novelty. The justification event, therefore 
is the formal and material assumption which makes it possible to reorganise 
a discourse about becoming based on the primacy of possibility over reality, 
and — therefore — also the discourse regarding evil. Evil is subsequently 
5 Jüngel, Eberhard: “Theologische Wissenschaft und Glaube” im Blick auf die Armut Jesu, in: 
Evangelische Theologie 24 (1964) 419–443. Jüngel quotes Aristotle mainly from Θ, 1 and 
3, while he almost completely ignores L, where a definition is given of the concepts of act 
and potency which will be discussed later on; moreover he does not seem to attribute any 
importance to the fact that according to Aristotle the primacy of act over potency is not a 
value in itself, but rather is functional, by analogy, to clarifying the relationship between 
matter (ὔλη) and form (εἶδος), supporting the theory that the relationship between act and 
potency is the same as that between form and matter. The “historical–existential decision 
of an almost irreversible extent” to which Jüngel refers, therefore in our opinion is more 
attributable to a metaphysics where act comes before potency, to the analogy to which 
this metaphysical approach is functional. Hartmann, whom Jüngel incidentally frequently 
quotes in the aforementioned essay, seems more balanced, when he sees in Aristotle the 
possibility of going beyond Aristotle’s metaphysics itself; see Hartmann, Nicolai: Teleolo-
gisches Denken, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1950, 66. 
6 See ID.: Die Welt als Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, 427.
7 Ibidem, 432. 
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defined by Jüngel as an “impossible reality”, in the sense that it is a phe-
nomenon devoid of the possibility of becoming actual in itself. This is essen-
tially a correction of Barth’s formula, according to whom the Nichtige, the 
nullifying nothingness arising out of the original denial of evil by God, was 
defined as an “impossible possibility”8. In this expression there remained 
a problematic actual reference to reality, which is redressed by Jüngel by 
choosing the perspective of the event of justification, an internal perspec-
tive to the world and to history. The Nichtige according to Barth, moreover, 
is difficult to define from a modal perspective: it exists, even though it is 
neither God nor a creature of His; it is not identifiable with nothingness, or 
with a non–entity9. The fact that God, on the one hand, should reify evil, 
albeit in a negative way by rejecting it, and that on the other side evil as 
Nichtige should exist in itself, although as an impossible possibility, implies 
— in terms of thought — renouncing logic, and therefore discourse. In this 
respect Barth’s argument runs the risk of theodicy because it is not (nor does 
it wish to be) an accomplished mereology, a theory of parts and of the whole. 
When the Nichtige is defined as a product of God’s rejection, there is actually 
a violation of the reflexivity principle, the founding concept of any mereol-
ogy, according to which any part is first of all part of itself. In Barth’s view it 
is important to state that the Nichtige is not part of itself as a part constituted 
by a rejection: it is set aside and thus becomes part, even though it does not 
exist according to the way of being of a part. An attempt is made to make 
the violation of the reflexivity principle acceptable through the extreme case 
of identity. As a matter of fact Barth nevertheless states that the Nichtige is 
itself, thus creating perplexity as to how it is possible to think that a part ex-
ists as such (is, therefore, externally founded) and at the same time exists as 
itself from itself (is, therefore, self–constructed)10. On a more general level 
compared to that of meeting some requirements in principle, the concept 
of “part” does not seem sufficiently generic to be applied to any domain. 
For example in the domain of immaterial objects such as phenomena, the 
relationship of a part cannot be distinguished from the implication relation-
ship11. In other words, this means that the nomination which God uses for 
8 Barth, Karl: Gott und das Nichtige, in: ID., Kirchliche Dogmatik. III/3. Die Lehre von der 
Schöpfung, Zürich: EVZ, 1950, 403.
9 Ibidem, 405.
10 Barth himself underlines that the Nichtige is not in God as if it were a part of him. This, on 
the one hand, avoids the idea of a demoniac God, as can be seen in Böhme or Schelling; 
on the other side, however, preventing such a deviation by referring to the extreme case of 
the identity of the Nichtige with itself, seems to create more logical problems than it can 
actually solve.
11 Simons, Peter: Parts. A Study in Ontology, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1987.
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nomination purposes also implies the coming to being of evil as a necessary 
part of nomination itself.
These considerations show that theology, if it wishes to avoid the aberra-
tion according to which God, in order to reject evil, would have been forced 
to generate it, should apply a critical interpretation of modal categories, and 
can no longer be satisfied with dogmatic formulations which have to be 
accepted as undisputable. To the extent that modal categories are used to 
establish the relationships of mutual implication between the assertions of 
traditional theodicy (God is good, God is almighty, the creation is good), a 
theory of the ways of parts in relation to the whole, which is clearly also a 
theory of the ways in which the whole holds together its parts, is unavoid-
able. It should be acknowledged that Barth, by interpreting the reification 
of evil as a result of denying God, creates a strong connection between the 
way of being and language. This moves our reflection towards an analysis 
of what happens every time God or humans affirm or deny something in 
respect of evil. 
“In the beginning was the yes”
If, according to Barth, evil is the effect of God’s no, according to Fuchs God 
is God as the one who says yes. The follower of Bultmann translates with a 
captivating phrase the first words of John’s Gospel: in the beginning was the 
yes12. From the perspective of an ontology of language, saying “yes” by God 
does not necessarily imply a “no” to what is not said, because it is meant not 
so much as a verbal expression, but rather as event of the God’s way of be-
ing in history: God is the one who, by wishing to be in the world and for the 
world, affirms it positively, and in this affirmation creates it. In other words, 
God’s “yes” is a language event, occurring through and caused by language, 
and not a linguistic translation of what happens. In this divine “yes” which 
saturates everything, evil is included as not necessary. The fallout on the 
anthropological side is significant. A human being, faced with an evil which 
is possible though not necessary, gains time. He is aware that something bad 
can always happen, but it is not necessarily that evil which has to happen. 
God takes care of the world by saying “yes” to it, and a human being can do 
the same. The “yes” which a human being says to the world, as an echo of 
the divine “yes” takes part in creation, gives life to the world of faith, where 
there is always the hope of something possible. In this sense it is said that 
12 Fuchs, Ernst: Das Christusverständnis bei Paulus und Johannes (1962), in: ID., Glaube und 
Erfahrung. Zum christologischen Problem im Neuen Testament (Gesammelte Aufsätze III), 
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 1965, 309ss. 
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anything is possible for someone who believes. However, having more time 
available, not being crushed by the unavoidability of evil, also means hav-
ing the possibility of critically distinguishing real from real, in other words 
of discerning, among the transformations of the present time, what is worth 
being saved, preserved and transferred from what should be abandoned to 
oblivion. In short: what is good from what is evil. Ernst Fuchs has nonethe-
less underlined that — in the analysis of each becoming — one should also 
acknowledge the inevitable passing of time13. In this way a time trade–off 
is established: a human being, because God says “yes” to the world, gains a 
timespan within which it is possible discern what is evil and what is good; 
this timespan, though, is in motion, joined to existence and its becoming. 
For this reason a human being, in order to achieve an essential understand-
ing of existence, to keep the question alive with regard to being there and 
to the possibility of remaining through becoming, has a finite amount of 
time, continuously to be regained, which is never given once and for all. 
Each amount of time gained which allows for self–understanding, is indeed 
preceded by a time loss, a sense of alienation which detaches from the self 
because the assessment of all possibilities is first and foremost estranging. 
This alienation has been acknowledged by early Christianity as Jesus’s death 
on the cross. The disciples acknowledged that the identification of God with 
the dead body of Jesus appeared as the death of the “yes”. History could 
remain a Holy Saturday without end, however another unconditional pos-
sibility — that of the resurrection — started to compete with this possibility, 
to the extent of causing a willingness not to be removed from the future one 
had hoped for. Where the delay was really experienced in the second advent 
which one expected, a distinction was operated between the possibility of 
hope and the possibility of the unavoidable. In the historical event where 
this knowledge found its language, there arose the New Testament, the liv-
ing hope that something unconditionally new may occur at any time14.
Within the New Testament, the parables are specific rhetorical figures 
which make the trading with time explicit. Those who listen to the parables 
are granted the time to deny as necessary an impossible reality and to affirm 
as possible a possibility with real consequences. As a matter of fact, God’s 
Kingdom, a possible figure of all possibilities, is not announced in abstract 
terms, but in situations where humans can gain the most from a trade–off 
with time, starting from where they spend time with what is most familiar 
to them. At home, for example, where one does not talk in order to be under-
stood, but rather one talks because one is understood. When something evil 
occurs in this respect, the phenomenon is never expressed as a direct “no” to 
13 Fuchs, Ernst: Hermeneutik, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 41970, 158.
14 Ibidem, 159.
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God, on the contrary it is expressed as a “yes” which starts to compete with 
the divine “yes”, a false affirmation which tries to emancipate itself from 
the world as creation and pretends to be a creation in itself. A human being 
who is affected by or guilty of evil renounces the possibility of keeping the 
question alive as to remaining and condemns him/herself to painfully living 
in the expectation of an affirmation as an impossible donor. And since this 
donating cannot achieve the height of the final donation by God, the gesture 
of offering is repeated until it becomes devoid of meaning. Of course, this 
negative and caricature–like imitation of the divine creative affirmation — 
albeit deformed — is a reversed image of it, and still remains a reverberation 
of the phrase: in the beginning was the yes.
Unconditional possibility, absolute affirmation
It has been noted that hermeneutic theology, with regard to our topic, argues 
a fundamental theory as an assumption: evil does not have an ontological 
consistency of it its own. In other words, evil thrives as a parasite of others’ 
lives, of the life arising from the yes which God says to Himself, to humans, 
to the world. Its possibility of being depends totally on the reality of being 
created. This, however, is a dependency which — in order not to appear as 
such — takes on the most diverse forms. This changing form, however, has 
nothing to do with God’s becoming, or rather it is a mockery thereof, a carica-
ture which perseveres in immobility and hinders all changes. As a matter of 
fact, evil finds it impossible, starting from itself, to add or subtract anything 
from what already is; therefore it is doomed to transforming itself through 
identical repetitions. The reality of evil cannot but continue to change in it-
self without ever being able to truly become something else. From a theologi-
cal perspective, only in the light of unconditional possibility, that is to say of 
the event of grace, is it possible to speculate as to why what appears as evil, 
is evil. In other words, only against the background of God’s concursus with 
history, against the backdrop of the cross, where Jesus’s death means putting 
the word “end” to the cyclicality of time, what appears as evil is actually so, 
as an opposition to what is new. This is obviously related to the complex 
epistemological issue regarding the possibility conditions within which it 
is possible to talk about what is new and, therefore, about what is opposed 
to it. Indeed, if we are able to formulate forecasting assertions in respect of 
what still has to happen, we are talking about an occurrence which quite 
simply “has not happened yet”, and not about an unconditional absolute. 
Does it therefore seem impossible to properly talk about evil? If the rela-
tionship between “knowing” and “saying” is interpreted as the primacy of 
the former over the latter, this question will necessarily have an affirmative 
answer. The same happens when talking about God by predicamento sub-
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stantiæ, whereby the proximity between God and humanity is traced back to 
an ever–increasing distance, and the same is bound to occur with regard to 
evil. On the contrary, if you admit that language is already the opening of a 
path to knowledge, if you admit that it is not merely a system of signs sub-
ordinated to thought, but rather that it is thought already, also the reference 
framework for the phenomenon of evil changes radically.
Consider once again what has been indicated here as the original lan-
guage event: “in the beginning was the yes”. As an event, there is no such 
thing as an idea of God and then the image of this idea which says: “yes”. 
On the contrary, God is the one saying “yes”, and that is exactly why he is 
God. He is God because he distinguishes what is possible from what is im-
possible, or something which is “not yet” possible from an unconditional 
possibility. Starting from this assumption, there is a criterion which makes it 
possible to establish, in a manner of saying, the possibility of conditions for 
what is possible. Jüngel refers to this epistemological principle as “analogia 
adventus”15: God’s coming into the world allows for a knowledge process 
which no longer presumes to understand the effects starting from a cause, 
but considers first of all the disclosing — through the word — of God’s gra-
tuitous wanting–to–be–there. God’s proximity to humanity, moreover, not 
only reveals God’s being, but reveals human beings to themselves; hence the 
way in which humans relate to the self and others is the same in which, by 
analogy, they relate to God. In other words, the human way of being–with–
others is analogous to the divine way of being–with–humanity.
Evil can be known as that phenomenon which goes against not so much 
the relationship between God and humanity, but rather against this “rela-
tionship between relationships”. The forms of this opposition are variable, 
as already mentioned, but they all lead to an idea of God in the self, on the 
one side, and humanity in the self on the other. In this respect, a grammar 
of becoming which can express in a unified language the absolute affirma-
tion is essential: God’s coming into the world and humanity’s inhabiting the 
complex of its relations. An ontological reflection about the rules underlying 
discourse organization is essential in order to tie language to the experience 
of evil, as well as to its essence. One of these rules should be the “primacy 
of possibility over reality” (or of potency over act), because only a language 
which contemplates the unconditional absolute, difference, a novelty which 
cannot be produced and is unavailable, acknowledges an irreducible space 
where one can continue to be amazed by narrations of the self, by the world, 
by God. 
Because amazement is the worst enemy of evil.
15 Jüngel, Eberhard: Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 82010, 383ss.
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Summary 
UNCONDITIONAL POSSIBILITY AND ABSOLUTE 
AFFIRMATION
For a theological grammar in support of a rigorous discourse 
regarding evil
The aim of this paper is to question the plausibility of a generic discourse regard-
ing evil, focusing on the need to prepare an appropriate theological grammar for 
the purpose. The field of research which has been taken into consideration here 
is the recent theological production of a hermeneutic nature in the protestant 
area, more specifically: Karl Barth, Ernst Fuchs and Eberhard Jüngel. Reference 
to these authors will prove that a systematic reflection about the use of modal 
categories (reality/possibility) and of enunciation assertions (affirmation/denial) 
is essential in order not to fail grasping an actual phenomenology of evil. 
KEYWORDS: evil, hermeneutics, possibility, affirmation, denial, temporality.
